Continuing professional development: Medico-legal aspects of epilepsy  by Brown, Stephen & Bird, Jonathan
doi:10.1053/seiz.2001.0518, available online at http://www.idealibrary.com on
Seizure 2001; 10: 68–74
Continuing professional development:
Medico-legal aspects of epilepsy
STEPHEN BROWN† & JONATHAN BIRD‡
†University of Plymouth Developmental Disabilities Research and Education Group, Plymouth, UK;
‡Directorate of Neurosciences, Burden Neurological Hospital, Bristol, UK
Correspondence to: Professor Stephen Brown, Developmental Disabilities Research & Education Group, Unit 10
Bodmin Business Centre, Bodmin PL31 1AQ, UK
Generally protection against possible litigation and good clinical practice go hand in hand. Situations in which the law has
special relevance for people with epilepsy, those who work with them, and their clinicians are reviewed with special reference
to the topics of driving, employment, duties of social carers, the clinician’s everyday role, the responsibilities of researchers
and epilepsy and the criminal law. What constitutes professional negligence is discussed, with special reference to the United
Kingdom. Clinicians are advised to think clearly, write clearly, communicate clearly and have a good relationship with their
patients.
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INTRODUCTION
As Tim Betts states in the accompanying article, pub-
lic attitudes to medical care and responsibility have al-
tered over the past couple of decades. Epileptology,
like the rest of medicine, is practised against a chang-
ing backdrop of litigation. There is less implicit trust
in doctors, greater expectation of outcomes, more risks
involved in achieving these outcomes, and an increas-
ing need for practitioners to ensure that, when brought
to task, all their actions can be seen to be appropri-
ate and in the patient’s best interests. The whole area
makes good media copy. One study that looked at this
noted1: ‘although it is encouraging that legal aspects
of epilepsy are receiving media attention, this atten-
tion could be used in a more positive manner in pro-
moting awareness, rather than many of the cases exam-
ined which appeared to use negative images in order to
pander to popular audience appeal’. But such is life.
The functions of legal systems include seeking
remedies for problems in a context of fairness and pro-
tection of rights, including protection of the vulner-
able from exploitation. The outcome of a legal pro-
cess where there is a dispute between parties may
inevitably fail to satisfy some of those involved. As
has been pointed out2 a doctor involved with epilepsy
may be legally involved in three particular ways, as an
agent of social control, as an advocate for the patient,
and as the target of liability or malpractice litigation.
Other clinicians such as nurses or psychologists may
be involved within these broad areas. The law also has
a wider perspective for people with epilepsy and those
involved in their care. Areas in which the clinical prac-
tice of epileptology moves into a legal arena may be
considered as the range of responsibilities exercised by
those involved. These will cover driving, employment,
various aspects of the clinician’s normal role, special-
ist aspects such as the application of criminal law and
epilepsy as a defence, and the responsibilities of re-
searchers. After discussing each of these in turn we
will conclude with a note on professional negligence
and how it is defined.
DRIVING
Most countries allow people with epilepsy to drive
ordinary family vehicles if they have been free from
seizures for a certain period, although a few still op-
erate a blanket ban. In the United Kingdom a person
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with epilepsy may be granted an ordinary licence for
Group 1 vehicles (motor cars and motorcycles) if free
from all types of seizure for 1 year, or if seizures have
only occurred in sleep for at least 3 years. It is impor-
tant to note that in addition to these rules, in which
some doctors are well rehearsed, there is an additional
provision that the driving of a vehicle must not be
likely to endanger the public. This last condition may
be relevant where there are other factors, such as neu-
rological or psychiatric illness, or drug side effects,
that may affect the ability to drive. Stricter criteria ap-
ply for Group 2 licences (large goods vehicles, passen-
ger carrying vehicles over 3.5 tonnes, and eight seats
or more, for hire or reward), and the person must have
had no epileptic seizures of any kind for the previous
10 years, and also have taken no antiepileptic medi-
cation during this period. Additionally, there must be
no continuing liability to epileptic seizures. These reg-
ulations apply to all seizure types, including isolated
auras. The 3 Hz spike-wave EEG discharges of pri-
mary generalized epilepsy used to be regarded in the
same way as seizures for this purpose, although other
epileptiform EEG phenomena were not (unless part of
a clinical seizure); however, recent editions of the reg-
ulations make no mention of this. An isolated seizure
without a previous diagnosis of epilepsy would still
acquire a 1-year ban. Provoked seizures (for example
those occurring in the context of tricyclic antidepres-
sant medication, or with acute head injury or acute
stroke) are dealt with by the licensing authority on an
individual basis. Where antiepileptic medication is be-
ing withdrawn in someone who is seizure free for more
than 12 months and who holds a Group 1 licence, it
is advised that the person abstains from driving from
the commencement of the period of withdrawal until
6 months after the drug withdrawal is complete, al-
though it is not necessary for the licence to be surren-
dered.
Different jurisdictions have varying laws. In Arizona
USA the required seizure-free interval was changed
from 12 months to 3 months in 1994. Early data sug-
gested that this was followed by a small but significant
increase in crashes, but further studies are required3.
On the UK driving licence there is a clearly written
instruction that the licensing agency must be informed
of any change in the person’s medical condition. Thus
the onus to inform lies with the patient. However the
doctor managing the epilepsy has a duty to explain the
situation to the patient. There is evidence that both
people with epilepsy and their doctors are often un-
aware of these important regulations4, even though ig-
norance of the law is not generally regarded as an ex-
cuse.
Patients’ knowledge is often inadequate especially
in the area of driving5, 6 and there is much literature
that attests to a low level of knowledge about the con-
dition among people with epilepsy that is attributed to
lack of information from professionals7, 8.
A situation may arise where someone with epilepsy
fails to report the condition to the licensing agency,
and the doctor is aware of it and considers that the
patient is a serious risk to self or others. This is one
of the rare occasions where a breach of confidential-
ity is justified in the public interest. Indeed, in the UK
the doctor is regarded as having an obligation to re-
port such a case personally. It is important to ensure
before doing this that the patient understands the legal
requirements. In such cases the doctor should inform
the patient (preferably in writing) of the intention to
report to the licensing agency, and should record this
in the patient’s notes. If the doctor is aware that the
patient is continuing to drive despite the licence being
revoked, it may be appropriate to inform the local po-
lice. It is advisable in such circumstances to discuss
the matter with an adviser from the doctor’s defence
organization.
A more common situation is the one where a person
has a current driving licence, is seizure free and tak-
ing medication, and where it is considered clinically
advisable to change medication to avoid potential ad-
verse medication effects. For example, there are cir-
cumstances in which some doctors may recommend
changing valproate to lamotrigine in women. In such
cases it is important to inform the patient of the risk
of loss of driving licence for 1 year if a seizure occurs.
Not to do so would be considered as a shortfall on the
doctor’s part. Needless to say the information given
should be recorded in the notes. There is an increasing
tendency to share with the patient the correspondence
between the hospital and the GP, and this would also
be an opportunity to ensure that the advice is properly
recorded.
A question may arise about the status of people who
have non-epileptic attack disorder (NEAD, or pseu-
doseizures). One US study9 showed that people with
NEAD had no increased crash rate over the normal
population; this study was however possibly flawed
because the sample was very small and highly se-
lected, there was no epilepsy control group, and it did
not address the tricky question of dual diagnosis. Ex-
perience would suggest that if there is any doubt about
the diagnosis, the epilepsy regulations should apply. If
on the other hand the NEAD represents another def-
inite diagnosis such as post-traumatic stress disorder,
with no evidence of epilepsy, it should be treated as
the other condition. In such cases our experience has
been that the licensing agency in the UK treats this like
other causes of non-epileptic collapse and imposes a
6-month ban.
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EMPLOYMENT
People with epilepsy cannot become airline pilots, or
join the Royal Navy or Fire Service. The police will
not recruit people who continue to have seizures, al-
though those with a past history may be considered.
Applicants to the teaching profession in the UK must
be seizure free for 2 years. Teachers in state schools
who develop epilepsy may be stopped from teaching
certain practical or technical subjects. In these cases
the person with epilepsy has a responsibility to in-
form the employers or potential employers. Failure to
do so could result in loss of employment. In these
and other cases there has not previously been any sig-
nificantly useful legal recourse for people refused a
job because of their epilepsy, or dismissed on health
grounds. However, the 1996 UK Disability Discrimi-
nation Act (DDA) was a small but significant step for-
ward in civil rights protection for people with disabil-
ities, and made it illegal for employers to discriminate
on the basis of disability. There have now been sev-
eral successful appeals against unfair dismissal on the
grounds of epilepsy under the DDA, although the law
continues to evolve. The establishment of the Disabil-
ity Rights Commission will play a part in this. In the
USA there is a wider-ranging legislation, the Amer-
icans with Disabilities Act (1990), experience with
which may yet influence developments elsewhere in
the world.
RISK ASSESSMENT IN SOCIAL CARE
SITUATIONS
Recently the proprietors of a social care home were
successfully prosecuted after a resident with severe
epilepsy and intellectual disability died after having
a seizure while bathing with what was deemed inad-
equate supervision10. This is a significant case em-
phasizing the responsibilities of social carers and the
importance of realistic risk assessments. Good prac-
tice would involve adequate liaison between different
agencies such as health and social services, and tragic
cases such as this may focus the minds of those who
are responsible for planning services.
THE CLINICIAN’S EVERYDAY ROLE
In the current ‘defensive’ culture of clinical practice,
clarity is the watchword; if we think clearly, write
clearly, communicate clearly and have a good relation-
ship with our patients we are less likely to get into
trouble. We must also be able to justify our clinical
approach.
Firstly, the diagnosis should be properly made.
There has been litigation around failure to adequately
investigate the aetiology of seizures which turned out
to be symptomatic, such as those associated with hy-
poglycaemia or hypocalcaemia.
When prescribing antiepileptic drugs (AEDs)
patients should be warned that some adverse effects
such as sedation are more likely to occur in the first
few days of treatment. If failure to do this (and record
that the advice was given) is associated with patients
putting themselves in situations where there is risk to
self or others, the doctor may be deemed responsible.
In the UK the British National Formulary (BNF) is
often used as a standard in legal cases. Courts would
probably expect that patients should also be routinely
warned of serious side effects as listed in the BNF.
Failure to follow accepted guidelines, such as those
for visual field screening in people taking vigaba-
trin, might be construed as negligent if an adverse
consequence resulted. This last responsibility is very
clear for hospital doctors, but in cases where the only
follow-up is with the GP, then the GP is the respon-
sible medical officer. Doctors should also be aware of
drug interactions especially those related to enzyme-
inducing AEDs, and they should know which AEDs
are not enzyme inducers.
One particular example of this is the prescribing of
the oral contraceptive (OC). Enzyme-inducing AEDs
reduce the efficacy of OCs. The management of this,
though uncomplicated, is beyond the scope of this
article. Women with epilepsy may be told that the
OC is safe with their AED when it is not, or they
may be told that they cannot have the OC when they
can. Valproate, for example, is not an enzyme inducer.
Nevertheless we know of cases where doctors have
told women that they cannot have the OC with val-
proate. Carbamazepine is an enzyme inducer. Even to-
day women are sometimes prescribed normal doses of
OC with carbamazepine, and have inadequate contra-
ceptive control. Both situations, if they led to adverse
consequences and litigation, are indefensible. But the
same doctor does not always prescribe the AED and
the OC, so whose responsibility is it to ensure these
topics are properly covered? Legally, usually the re-
sponsibility is taken as belonging to the doctor who
prescribed the second drug. If the GP adds the OC to
someone already taking an AED, then it is the GP’s
responsibility; if the hospital doctor starts an AED in
a woman taking the OC it is the hospital doctor’s re-
sponsibility.
A related area which attracts medico-legal attention
is the management of pregnancy, and in particular the
subject of AED teratogenicity. Pre-conceptual coun-
selling is good practice; recording it in the notes is es-
sential. Having written information that can be given
to the patient is helpful, as long as it is accurate. Guide-
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lines exist for managing women’s issues in epilepsy,
and the content of these ought to be familiar to doctors
who treat women with epilepsy11. For GPs (and hospi-
tal doctors) an excellent account is given in Malcolm
Taylor’s book12.
The doctor also has a responsibility to write pre-
scriptions clearly and unambiguously. Dispensing
pharmacists also bear a responsibility, which may lay
them open to litigation13. Most epileptologists would
probably agree about the desirability of maintaining
brand continuity of AEDs. Seizure-associated accident
resulting from brand or generic substitution of an AED
could be regarded as the responsibility of the person
who caused the substitution (usually the doctor, but in
some cases the pharmacist).
Even if the doctor knows what is going on this
does not mean that the patient fully understands the
regime, and this can result in even the best-kept med-
ical records being inaccurate14. Not sorting this out,
and not making sure there is proper communication,
could render the doctor liable.
CRIMINAL LAW AND EPILEPSY AS A
DEFENCE
Before 1991 in the UK the topic of legal aspects of
automatism in epilepsy could occupy much space in a
review such as this, but with the Criminal Procedure
(Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act matters have be-
come more straightforward. For guilt to be established
it has to be shown that the person did the deed (actus
reus) and intended to do it or did it out of recklessness
(mens rea). Legal (as opposed to medical) automatism
occurs if actus reus is established but mens rea is ab-
sent. These legal automatisms could be sane, arising
from an extrinsic cause such as hypoglycaemia in a
person with diabetes who took too much insulin or in-
sane, arising from an intrinsic cause such as epilepsy
(or, paradoxically, hypoglycaemia in a person with an
insulinoma). Whereas offences committed during sane
automatism could result in discharge, those commit-
ted during insane automatisms used to attract hospi-
tal and restriction orders under Sections 37 and 41 of
the Mental Health Act. Falk-Pedersen15, in a recent re-
view of the international position, stated ‘The distinc-
tion made in the common law tradition between sane
and insane automatisms, and in particular the labelling
of epileptic automatisms as insane, are legal concepts
which surprise and even astonish lawyers of other tra-
ditions, whether they work within a civil law system
or one with elements both from civil law and common
law.’ Fortunately, under the 1991 Act, a finding of in-
sane automatism in English law leaves the court with
a wider range of possible outcomes, including hospital
treatment, guardianship, supervision and treatment, or
absolute discharge.
Violent acts associated with seizures are extremely
rare, though not unknown16. There is at least one
case of baby stealing described in the literature17. An
epilepsy defence is sometimes offered for less seri-
ous charges such as shoplifting. It is of course quite
possible that someone could pick up something and
walk off with it towards the end of a complex partial
seizure, without any intention to do so. Fenwick18 has
suggested the following guidelines, which might help
when providing a professional opinion to a court in
such a case:
(1) The defendant should be shown to have had
epilepsy before the offence was committed.
(2) The offence should not be premeditated.
(3) After the episode, the defendant should show
confusion.
(4) After the episode, the defendant should seek
help (if appropriate) and should not hide the ev-
idence.
(5) There must be amnesia for the act.
(6) Witnesses should testify to confusion during or
immediately after the episode.
RESPONSIBILITIES OF RESEARCHERS
Most clinical trials are carried out in an atmosphere
of meticulous (some might say excessive) documenta-
tion, but there are potential medico-legal risks if sub-
jects are inadequately informed or feel coerced into
partaking. In one recent study of parents whose chil-
dren took part in a randomized controlled study19, it
was suggested that 25% of subjects felt obliged to par-
ticipate. This could cause problems if there was an ad-
verse outcome to the trial. It was concluded that there
were various ways in which parents’ understanding
of the process might be improved, e.g. by designing
easier to understand consent forms, and that measures
should be taken to avoid parents feeling obliged to par-
ticipate, rather than giving true informed consent.
PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE
For negligence to be established in English law, the
plaintiff must establish: (a) that a duty of care was
owed to him or her; (b) that the defendant was in
breach of that duty; and (c) that the breach of duty
caused the injury of which the plaintiff is complaining.
The burden of proof lies with the plaintiff. However, in
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civil cases proof only has to be on the balance of prob-
ability and not as in criminal cases, beyond reasonable
doubt. If consent has been given to a procedure or ex-
amination, this might be defence to a criminal charge
of assault, but it may not be a defence to a civil claim
for damages.
So what constitutes negligence? In the so-called Bo-
lam defence20 the practitioner is not guilty of negli-
gence if he or she has acted in accordance with a prac-
tice accepted as proper by a responsible body of pro-
fessionals skilled in that particular art. This ‘responsi-
ble body’ need not be numerically large as long as it
can be shown to be responsible. The defence allows for
the possibility that not all practitioners may agree, and
is sometimes known as the ‘two schools of thought de-
fence’. However, the action of the defendant still needs
to be shown to be responsible; just calling colleagues
in support who would have done the same thing is no
good if their reasons do not stand up to analysis, and
some judges have taken this view.
A question arises where novel or experimental treat-
ment is being tried. The burden of proof is still on the
plaintiff, but the practitioner would have to demon-
strate the reasoning, research and planning that led up
to the procedure.
Where a mistake occurs in a medical context but is
not a question of professional skill (records lost, slides,
specimens mixed up), the mistake is one of incompe-
tence and is indefensible.
The alternative to Bolam has been called the Can-
terbury argument after a landmark case in the USA21.
Here the judgement concluded:
(1) Every human of adult years and sound mind has
the right to determine what shall be done with
his or her body.
(2) ‘Consent’ is the informed exercise of a choice
. . . entailing the opportunity to evaluate knowl-
edgeably the options available and the risks at-
tendant on each.
(3) The doctor must therefore disclose all material
risks.
(4) But the doctor may exercise ‘therapeutic privi-
lege’ (if a reasonable medical assessment indi-
cates that disclosure would pose serious threat
of psychological detriment to the patient).
The question therefore is what is a material risk?
In the Canterbury judgement this is to be determined
by the ‘prudent patient’ test. Thus ‘a risk is material
when a reasonable person, in what a physician knows
or should know to be the patient’s position, would be
likely to attach significance to the cluster of risks in de-
ciding whether or not to forgo the proposed therapy’.
The Canterbury argument has not been totally success-
fully transformed into English Law. In an important
case22 the Bolam defence was successfully used where
someone had not been warned before consenting to
an operation of the risk of an uncommon but serious
complication, which she then developed. The House
of Lords decision on this has however been contro-
versial, and in some other cases judges have taken the
view exemplified by one who said23 ‘although some
surgeons may not have been warning patients similar
in situation to the plaintiff of the risk that omission was
neither reasonable nor responsible’.
This is all very theoretical: how does it apply to the
practice of epileptology? Following evidence-based
guidelines will help avoid pitfalls, as will marshalling
and recording the reasons for occasionally deviating
from them. Communication with patients and their
families remains all-important. The mantra remains
‘think clearly, write clearly, communicate clearly and
have a good relationship with patients’.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors would like to thank staff from the British
Epilepsy Association National Information Centre and
from the Medical Adviser’s Department, Driver and
Vehicle Licensing Agency, for assistance in preparing
this paper.
REFERENCES
1. Coyle, H. P. and Brown, S. Epilepsy, the law and the media.
Medicine & Law 1997; 16: 323–337.
2. Hughes, J. T. and Devinsky, O. Legal aspects of epilepsy. Neu-
rologic Clinics 1994; 12: 203–223.
3. Drazkowski, J. F., Fisher, R. S. and Blum, D. E. Driving
crashes in Arizona after reducing the required seizure-free in-
terval. Epilepsia 1999; 40 (Suppl. 7): 104.
4. Kelly, R., Warke, T. and Steele, I. Medical restrictions to driv-
ing: the awareness of patients and doctors. Postgraduate Med-
ical Journal 1999; 75: 537–539.
5. Long, L., Reeves, A. L., Moore, J. L., Roach, J. and Pickering,
C. T. An assessment of epilepsy patients’ knowledge of their
disorder. Epilepsia 2000; 41: 727–731.
6. Dawkins, J. L., Crawford, P. M. and Stammers, T. G. Epilepsy:
a general practice study of knowledge and attitudes among suf-
ferers and non-sufferers. British Journal of General Practice
1993; 43: 453–457.
7. Goldstein, L. H., Minchin, L., Stubbs, P. and Fenwick, P. B.
Are what people know about their epilepsy and what they want
from an epilepsy service related? Seizure 1997; 6: 435–442.
8. Chappell, B. and Smithson, W. H. Patient views on primary
care services for epilepsy and areas where additional profes-
sional knowledge would be welcome. Seizure 1998; 7: 447–
457.
9. Benbadis, S. R., Blustein, J. N. and Sunstad, L. Should patients
with psychogenic nonepileptic seizures be allowed to drive?
Epilepsia 2000; 41: 895–897.
10. Great Yarmouth Mercury. Home’s denial on bath tragedy. 11th
November 2000.
Continuing professional development 73
11. Crawford, P., Appleton, R., Betts, T., Duncan, J., Guthrie, E.
and Morrow, J. Best practice guidelines for the management
of women with epilepsy. The women with epilepsy guidelines
development group. Seizure 1999; 8: 201–217.
12. Taylor, M. P. Managing Epilepsy: A Clinical Handbook. Ox-
ford, Blackwell Science Ltd, 2000.
13. Anonymous. Jury finds pharmacy’s misfilling of prescrip-
tion caused child’s brain damage. Journal of Child Neurology
1999; 14: 263–264.
14. Whitehouse, W. and Morris, B. Paediatric out-patient
antiepileptic drug doses recorded in the medical charts are not
reliable: implications for the notion of noncompliance. Seizure
1997; 6: 41–42.
15. Falk-Pedersen, J. K. Automatisms in non common law coun-
tries. Medicine & Law 1997; 16: 359–365.
16. Treiman, D. M. Psychobiology of ictal aggression. Advances
in Neurology 1991; 55: 341–356.
17. McNulty, C., Cahil, K. and de la Granja, M. B. Attempted
child-stealing: post-ictal psychosis and psychological distress.
Medicine, Science & the Law 1999; 39: 146–152.
18. Fenwick, P. B. C. Episodic dyscontrol. In: Epilepsy: The Com-
prehensive CD-ROM (Eds J. Engel Jr. and T. A. Pedley). Lip-
pincott Williams & Wilkins, 1999: Chapter. 266.
19. van Stuijvenberg, M., Suur, M. H., de Vos, S., Tjiang, G. C.,
Steyerberg, E. W., Derksen-Lubsen, G. and Moll, H. A. In-
formed consent, parental awareness, and reasons for partici-
pating in a randomised controlled study. Archives of Diseases
in Childhood 1998; 79: 120–125.
20. Bolam vs. Friern Hospital Management Committee 957 1
WLR 582.
21. Canterbury v. Spence (DC 1972) 464 F 2d 772.
22. Sidaway v. Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospi-
tal [1985] AC 871.
23. Smith v. Tunbridge Wells Health Authority [1994] 5 Med
LR321.
Self-assessment questions
1. Drivers with a history of epilepsy in the UK:
(a) must have been seizure free for at least 10 years to hold a Group 2 licence.
(b) may still be taking antiepileptic medication and hold a Group 2 licence.
(c) must have been seizure free for 3 years to hold a Group 1 licence.
(d) may not drive or hold a current licence if an EEG in the past year has shown 3 Hz spike-wave dis-
charges.
(e) should voluntarily abstain from driving if medication is being withdrawn until 6 months after the last
dose.
2. In UK medical negligence litigation:
(a) the defendant has to prove that most other doctors would have done the same.
(b) the defendant has to prove that he or she was not responsible for the injury of which the plaintiff
complains.
(c) the plaintiff has to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant breached a duty of care and caused
an injury to the plaintiff.
(d) if it can be shown that the plaintiff consented to the procedure in question no action can succeed against
the defendant.
(e) an action for negligence will succeed if it can be shown that the doctor has not disclosed all material
risks before obtaining consent to a procedure.
3. The following are true:
(a) legal automatism is defined as mens rea in the absence of actus reus.
(b) under the 1991 Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act, a finding that an offence was
committed under an insane automatism must result in compulsory detention under the Mental Health
Act.
(c) if it is proved that the accused committed an offence while in a confused state following a seizure, this
will result in an absolute discharge.
(d) if insane automatism is proved the court has a variety of disposals available.
(e) an action occurring during hypoglycaemia in insulin-dependent diabetes is an example of insane au-
tomatism.
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Answers
1. (a) is true.
(b) is false: for Group 2 licences (or large goods vehicles, passenger carrying vehicles over 3.5 tonnes, and
eight seats or more, for hire or reward), the driver must have not taken antiepileptic medication for 10
years as well as being seizure free for that period.
(c) is false: for Group 1 licences (motor cars and motorcycles) the person must be either free from all types
of seizure for 1 year, or seizures must have only occurred in sleep for at least 3 years.
(d) is false: while preparing this paper, the authors sought clarification from the Licensing Agency about
this particular point. It seems the current view is that if someone has a seizure during an EEG the
Agency needs to be informed. However, if there is epileptic activity on the EEG which is not clinically
apparent, the driving entitlement is not affected.
(e) is true.
2. (a) is false: the defendant would be helped by showing that a responsible body of practitioners would have
acted the same way. This body need not be numerically large, but it would have to be shown to be
responsible.
(b) is false: the burden of proof is on the plaintiff, not the defendant.
(c) is false: in civil cases, such as negligence litigation, the proof is based on balance of probability, and
this does not have to be demonstrated ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, a condition which applies in criminal
cases.
(d) is false: if consent has been given to a procedure or examination, this might be defence to a criminal
charge of assault, but it may not be a defence to a civil claim for damages.
(e) is false: this is not necessarily true in English law, although it has been taken as a principle in US law.
3. (a) is false: it is the other way round.
(b) is false: the 1991 Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act reversed this state of affairs
and made a wider variety of disposals available to the court.
(c) is false: this is only one of a variety of disposals available, which include hospital treatment, guardian-
ship, supervision and treatment, and absolute discharge.
(d) is true.
(e) is false: this is an example of sane automatism.
